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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most painful experiences of my government service occurred on January 18, 1985, when as Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs I was called on to sign
letters informing Congress of the President's decision "not to participate
further in the case brought by Nicaragua before the International Court
of Justice." 1 I felt deeply that the United States approach was mistaken-not so much on legal2 as on political grounds'-and in advocat* Robert F. Turner (A.B. 1968, Indiana University; J.D. 1981, University of Virginia) is President of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), which Congress established in 1984 to promote scholarship and education about international conflict resolution. Among his several books, he is the author of a study on the factual issues of the
present case, NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES: A LOOK AT THE FAcTs, which the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis plans to publish later this year. The writer emphasizes
that all opinions expressed are his own, and in particular, do not represent views of
USIP.
1. Letter from Robert F. Turner to Sen. Richard G. Lugar (January 7, 1986) (explaining the decision not to participate in the case any further). See generally R. TURNER, NICARAGUA V. UNrrED STATES: A LOOK AT THE FACTs (forthcoming, Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis 1987).
2. While I was not enthusiastic about one or two of the legal arguments that were
being considered, on balance I thought the United States made a very strong case during
the preliminary phase that Nicaragua had never perfected its acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction, and thus the Court manifestly lacked jurisdiction. However, given even a
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ing my views I pushed strongly against the proper limits of legitimate
reasonably fair hearing which I anticipated in light of the Court's handling of the Iran
Claims case, I believed that the United States had an extremely strong case that it was
acting legally pursuant to article 51 of the Charter should it choose to grant the Court
jurisdiction to decide the case. Although I advocated going forward on the merits, I argued as a fallback that in the event the United States decided to avoid litigation, it should
predicate such a decision on the 1946 Vandenberg Reservation to United States acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction, which denied the Court jurisdiction over cases involving disputes
"arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the
decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America
specially agrees to jurisdiction." International Court of Justice: United States Recognition of Compulsory Jurisdiction, August 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598.
Although the United States successfully invoked this reservation vis-6-vis the absence of
El Salvador, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 38, 146-50 [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S., Merits], it
failed to even argue the more compelling (and politically more powerful, see infra note
3) case, which would have emphasized the fact that key parties to the underlying dispute
- e.g., Cuba, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which have been supplying or transporting
most of the hundreds of tons of weapons and military equipment that Nicaragua has
been smuggling into El Salvador since 1980 - refuse to accept the Court's jurisdiction
and thus are beyond the reach of the ICJ. As the Court noted, "The Court has no
jurisdiction to rule upon the conformity with international law of any conduct of states
not parties to the present dispute. . . ." Id. at 109. The inability of the ICJ to deal
effectively with the problem results primarily from the refusal of the Soviet Union and
most of its Marxist-Leninist allies to accept the rule of international law and the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. The United States position would be essentially
that set forth by Senator Vandenberg in 1945, when he told his Senate colleagues:
I want a new dignity and a new authority for international law. I think American
self-interest requires it. But . . . this also requires whole-hearted reciprocity. In
honest candor I think we should tell other nations that this glorious thing we
contemplate is not and cannot be one-sided. I think we must say again that unshared idealism is a menace which we could not undertake to underwrite in the
postwar world.
91 CONG. REC. 166 (1945) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg). This was an approach I
believed reasonable people could understand and had the added benefit of pressuring
Managua's allies to submit to ICJ jurisdiction.
3. Despite its strong legal merits, the United States argument that Nicaragua had
never properly accepted the Court's jurisdiction reminded me of an "exclusionary rule"
defense - the implicit message for many would be that even if the United States could
not be taken to court, its reliance on a "legal technicality" to keep the ICJ from considering the case on the merits was an apparent admission that the United States knew it was
acting unlawfully and was afraid of having its actions considered on the merits. Although
the strongest evidence of Nicaraguan aggression against its neighbors was highly classified and could not be shared with the Court without jeopardizing critical intelligence
sources and methods, I felt that once the program had become public it was important
for the United States to address the issues publicly on the merits. Public understanding
and support is essential if United States foreign policy initiatives are to succeed. This
means not only that policy must have a strong moral foundation, but also that this moral
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dissent within the bureaucracy.
Having defended the Court against speculative criticism from lawyers
and nonlawyers alike, I was particularly saddened to read its majority
opinion on the merits of the case." I believe the Court has done itself a
grave disservice. It has given credence to legal interpretations that are
inimical to the preservation of international peace and by its handling of
evidence has fueled charges of political bias, thus jeopardizing its ability
to deal with future international disputes which might threaten the
peace. Although one can understand the Court's displeasure at the
United States decision not to participate further in the proceedings of the
case, the Court in its apparent anger has gone far towards vindicating
the decision to withdraw. This result is most unfortunate, because international judicial tribunals have an important role to play in the resolution of international conflicts.

II. THE LAW: UNDERMINING COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
The Court's decision on the legal issues is so flawed that one hardly
knows where to begin a critique. One would wish to be charitable and
acknowledge at least that the Court properly rejected the idea of a "general right of intervention in support of an opposition within another
State." 5 While this conclusion arguably represents a rejection of a central
thesis of so-called "socialist international law," it was necessary in the
instant case in order for the Court to hold against the United States for
its support of the contras. Furthermore, the Court appears to have qualified its decision on this point to leave open the argument that such intervention is permissible in opposition to certain types of regimes. 7 This
doctrine promotes war and is clearly incompatible with the fundamental

underpinning must be apparent to the public. As Jefferson observed in 1809: "[I]t has a
great effect on the opinion of our people and the world to have the moral right on our
side.... ." XII WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 274 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh, eds.
1904). By first appearing to hide behind a legal "loophole" and then walking away from
the Court, the United States essentially surrendered the moral high ground in the debate
- this was particularly ironic given the moral strength of the underlying United States
objective of deterring international aggression.
4. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
5. Id. at 107-10. The Court said: "The Court considers that in international law, if
one State, with a view to the coercion of another State, supports and assists armed bands
in that State whose purpose is to overthrow the government of that State, that amounts to
an intervention by the one State in the internal affairs of the other." Id. at 124.
6. See generally J. MOORE & R. TURNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
BREZHNEv DOCTRINE (forthcoming, University Press of America 1987).
7. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 108.
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principles of the United Nations Charter (the Charter).
Two important legal doctrines emerge from the case that are unjustified by the Charter and contrary to the long-term interests of international peace. First, the Court concluded that the type of assistance Nicaragua is accused of supplying to the antigovernment guerrillas in El
Salvador-a combination of arms, ammunition, money, training, secure
military bases, command-and-control, and communications support 8-does not constitute an "armed attack" under article 51 of the
Charter.9 Second, the Court held that in the absence of such narrowly
defined "armed attack," a victim of external armed aggression may not
seek necessary and proportional assistance, even under regional security
arrangements in defense of its freedom.1" This overly narrow construction of the "armed attack" language in article 51-which translates
"armed aggression" (aggressionarmbe) in the equally authentic French
text-is incompatible with the fundamental non-use-of-force provision of
article 2(4),2 the underlying purposes and principles of the United Na-

8. The writer's forthcoming study includes a detailed discussion of Nicaraguan assistance to the Salvadoran insurgents, see R. TURNER, supra note 1. The House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence provided a useful summary in May 1983, which on the
basis of regularly reviewing "voluminous intelligence materials" concluded "with certainty" that "[a] major portion of the arms and other material sent by Cuba and other
communist countries to the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with the permission
and assistance of the Sandinistas," that "[tihe Salvadoran insurgents rely on the use of
sites in Nicaragua, some of which are located in Managua itself, for communications,
command-and-control, and for the logistics to conduct their financial, material and propaganda activities" and that "[t]he Sandinista leadership sanctions and directly facilitates

all of the above functions."

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,

1983,
H.R. Rep. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5-6 (1983). See also Nicar. v. U.S.,
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 6. Given this Committee's consistent opposition to United States
support for the contras and the likelihood that its members were aware that these conclusions support arguments for more aid, these statements constitute virtual admissions
against interest.
9. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. . . ." U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
10. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
11. By this same narrow logic, the reference in article 51 to assisting "members" of
the United Nations would suggest that the Charter prohibits collective assistance to nonmembers who are victims of armed aggression - a doctrine clearly rejected by the
United Nations at the time of the Korean War.
12. "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER,

AMENDMENT TO THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
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tions as set forth in article 1(1)13 and the clear travaux priparatoiresof
the Charter.1 '
Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the full extent of Nicaragua's intervention in El Salvador,15 and the legal principles involved
do not depend on the facts of any particular case. At issue is whether the
Charter prohibits a relatively small and peaceful state from seeking necessary and proportional defensive help from its regional treaty partners"6
when a more powerful state (or group of states) unlawfully attempts to
overthrow the first state's government by providing massive amounts of
arms and military equipment, money, training, military advice and other
means short of committing its own troops to battle.
This issue is critical because the preferred forms of aggression in the
contemporary world are low-intensity and covert intervention. Indirect
armed aggression can totally transform the nature of an internal struggle
and, in the long run, overthrow a relatively weak state's government as
effectively and completely as a direct cross-border invasion.1 7 A holding

art. 2, sec. 4 (emphasis added). Writing in Self-Defence in InternationalLaw, Professor

Bowett has observed:
[T]he view of Committee I at San Francisco was that this prohibition [in article
2(4) of the Charter] left the right of self-defensd unimpaired; in the words of its
rapporteur "the use of arms in legitimate self-defence remains admitted and
unimpaired." . . . Indeed, it is difficult to see what other conclusion could be
reached, for if we examine the substantive rights protected by self-defence the absence of any inconsistency with Art. 2(4) is apparent. Action undertaken for the
purpose of, and limited to, the defence of a state's political independence, territorial integrity, the lives and property of its nationals... cannot by definition involve a threat or use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence" of any other state.... Nor can it be said that the protection of those same
substantive rights by the exercise of self-defence is "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."...
BowgrT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-86 (1958), quoted in 12 M.
WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-44 (1971).
13. "The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace

and security, and to that end; to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace. . . ." U.N. CHARTER, art. I, para. 1 (emphasis added).
14. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
15. For such a discussion, see generally R. TURNER, supra note 1, and Moore, The
Secret War in CentralAmerica and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43
(1986).
16. Or for that matter, from any willing state.
17. "Quite obviously, indirect aggression can undermine the sovereignty of a state as
effectively as a traditional armed attack. To argue that a state may not employ force to
combat indirect aggression reveals a considerable lack of understanding of the purposes of
the Charter. The drafters meant only to proscribe the unlawful use of force, not coercion
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by the World Court that restricts weak states to their own resources in
responding to this type of aggression may produce two unfortunate results: (1) potential aggressors may be encouraged to subvert weaker and
more peaceful states; and (2) less powerful states that may have focused
their energies on providing for the needs of their people, with confidence
that their friends and treaty partners would help in the event they became a victim of aggression, may need to reexamine their own military
capabilities. In the end, this could lead to an outbreak of arms races as
individual states find it necessary to provide independently for their own
defense. Either of these consequences would be unfortunate.
Unquestionably, it is unlawful under the Charter and customary international law for more powerful states to engineer the overthrow of
weaker states by providing arms, logistical support, training and similar
assistance to opposition groups within the less powerful states. To do so
would violate article 2(4) of the Charter"8 and numerous other international legal instruments."' The 1950 "Peace Through Deeds" Resolution
of the United Nations General Assembly summarized the prevailing law
in defense of such basic values as political independence or territorial integrity." R.
HULL & J. NOVOGROD, LAW AND VIETNAM 120 (1968). See also a statement by British Foreign Secretary Lloyd to the House of Commons in the context of the 1958 United
States deployment of armed forces in Lebanon:
What happens? A foreign Government determines to use a dissident element

within another State to overthrow the legitimate Government by force. The technique is the smuggling of arms and explosives, the infiltration of agents, a virulent
propaganda campaign, incitement to insurrection and assassination and, finally,
the plot against the lives of the constitutional leaders ...
On the general points of principle affecting indirect aggression, I believe that a
country has the right to ask for help from other countries when it feels itself to be
in danger.

. .

. Unless countries are prepared to respond to such appeals for help

I think that we shall see one country after another go down to this form of
aggression ...
Statement of British Foreign Secretary Lloyd to House of Commons (discussing United
States assistance to the Government of Lebanon in 1958), quoted in 12 WHrrEMAN,
supra note 12, at 221.
18. See, e.g., those instruments listed in Moore, supra note 15, at 80-81.
19. See supra note 12. The key question in an article 2(4) analysis ought to be
whether the state in question has substantially and intentionally contributed to a "threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," and
not whether the actual instruments used for this aggression were native to the aggressor,
the victim or a third state. Thus, one should distinguish between interventions which do
not involve a use of force (e.g., propaganda, espionage, economic pressure), and intervention intended to result in the use of armed force, the destruction of property and the
taking of lives (e.g., direct invasion, employing mercenaries to conduct an invasion or
providing substantial assistance to armed guerrilla groups for the purpose of assisting
them in bringing about political change in another state by armed force).
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well, providing:
The General Assembly,... condemning the intervention of a state in the
internal affairs of another state for the purpose of changing its legally
established government by the threat or use of force,
1. Solemnly reaffirms that, whatever the weapons used, any aggression,
whether committed openly, or BY FOMENTING CIVIL STRIFE in the interest
of a foreign power, or otherwise, is THE GRAVEST OF ALL CRIMES
AGAINST PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD;

2. Determines that for the realization of lasting peace and security it is
indispensable:
(1) That prompt UNITED action be taken to meet aggression wherever it
arises ....0

The Charter does not define the term "aggression," in part because
many states were concerned that no definition could be comprehensive
enough to insure that potential aggressors could not find a loophole to
avoid its terms." In 1951, however, the General Assembly asked the
International Law Commission to attempt to define "aggression. 2 2 The
20. G.A. Res. 380-V, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950) (emphasis added). See also the November 3, 1947 General Assembly Resolution
in which the General Assembly "[c]ondemn[ed] all forms of propaganda ... which is
either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression...." G.A. Res. 110 (II), 2 U.N. GAOR (108th plen. mtg.) at
205 (1947) and the "Essentials of Peace" Resolution approved by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 1, 1949, which called upon every nation: "3. To refrain
from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence
or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people
in any State." G.A. Res. 290(IV), 4 U.N. GAOR (261st plen. mtg.) (1949).
21. As President Truman explained in 1950:
At the San Francisco Conference. . .there was a movement to insert a definition
of aggression in the United Nations Charter. The United States opposed this proposal. It took the position that a definition of aggression cannot be so comprehensive as to include all cases of aggression and cannot take into account the various
circumstances which might enter into the determination of aggression in a particular case. Any definition of aggression is a trap for the innocent and an invitation to
the guilty.
Report by the President to Congress for the year 1950 at 170, quoted in 5 WHrrEMAN,
supra note 12, at 740.
22. Report of the International Law Commission, Covering the work of its third
session, 16 May-27 July 1951, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/1858
(1951), reprinted in [1951] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 89-122, 221-237, 378-381, 389394, 422-423, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1951, quoted in 5 WHrEImAN, supra note 12,

at 745-47. The Committee's records indicate:
The International Law Commission considered whether it should follow the enumerative method or try to draft a definition of aggression in general terms. Mr.
Yepes of Colombia submitted a proposal based on the enumerative method. Mr.
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Commission arrived at the following definition:
Aggression is the threat or use of force by a State or government against
another State, in any manner, whatever the weapons employed and
whether openly or otherwise, for any reason or for any purpose other than
individual or collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation by a competent organ of the United Nations."3

Following the approval of the "Peace Through Deeds" Resolution by
the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, the International
Law Commission included as a definition of "aggression" in its draft
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: "The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of activities calAmado of Brazil and Mr. Alfaro of Panama submitted general formulas. "The
sense of the Commission was that it was undesirable to define aggression by a
detailed enumeration of aggressive acts, since no enumeration could be exhaustive.
...It was therefore decided that the only practical course was to aim at a general
and abstract definition." For this purpose, the Commission took as a basis of discussion the text submitted by Mr. Alfaro, as it was the broadest definition before
the Commission....
The Commission "felt that a definition of aggression should cover not only force
used openly by one State against another, but also indirect forms of aggression
such as the fomenting of civil strife by one State in another, the arming by a State
of organized bands for offensive purposes directed against another State, and the
sending of 'volunteers' to engage in hostilities against another State." . . . The

Commission finally decided to amend the definition proposed by Mr. Alfaro by
including threat of force. Certain other changes were made in the text submitted
by Mr. Alfaro.
Id. at 745-46.
23. 5 WHrTEMAN, supra note 12, at 746. Some members considered this definition
as not comprehensive and "dangerously restrictive" of United Nations action. In the final
vote, the Commission rejected the definition by a vote of 7 to 3 with one abstention. Id. at
747. Sir Humphrey Waldock, discussing a Commission comment on its proposed definition, wrote:
The Commission ... expressly said that aggression may also be committed by

other acts than resort to armed force in breach of the Charter. It indicated that
some of the other crimes in its list might equally constitute acts of aggression and
seems to have had in mind particularly:
(a) The incursion into the territory of one State from the territoryof another by
armed bands actingfor a political purpose....
(b) Fomenting civil strife, or tolerating activities calculated to foment civil
strife, in another State....
(c) Encouragement of terrorist activities in another State or toleration of organised activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State....
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 RECUEIL DEs Cous 451, 508-11 (1952, vol. II), quoted in 5 WHITEMAN,
supra note 12, at 749-50.
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culated to foment civil strife in another State, or the toleration by the
authorities of a state of organized activities calculated to foment civil
strife in another State."'24 Given the parties to the present International
Court of Justice (ICJ) case, it is noteworthy that American states were
particularly prominent in the efforts to ensure that the definition of aggression encompassed indirect actions.25
In responding to armed aggression, a state may use necessary and proportional armed force, 26 and also may seek the help of other states in
defending itself. The language of article 51 of the Charter recognizes the
right of individual or collective self-defense as an "inherent" right of
states.17 For the parties to the instant ICJ case, the 1945 Act of Chapultepec included the doctrine of collective defense, providing in part 1(3):
"That every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of
the territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an
American State, shall .. . be considered as an act of aggression against
28
the other States which sign this Act."1
This doctrine was carried forward a few months later in the drafting
of article 51 of the U.N. Charter, under the able leadership of U.S. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who chaired the subcommittee of Commission
III at San Francisco." In summarizing the product of the negotiations,

24. Question of Defining Aggression: Report of the Secretary-General, 7 U.N.
GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 54) at 17, 71-74, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952) [hereinafter
Defining Aggression], quoted in 5 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 823.
25. Bolivia proposed, for example, a draft resolution in early 1952 defining as "an
act of aggression" any "action taken by a State, overtly or covertly, to incite the people of
another State to rebellion with the object of changing the political structure for the benefit of a foreign Power." Id. Other states that were outspoken in support of outlawing
indirect as well as direct aggression included: Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Canada, the United States and Uruguay. See 5 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 824-25.
26. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 265-68 (1963), quoted in 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 13; BowErT, supra
note 12, at 184-86, quoted in 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 43-44; HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE ORGANS OF THE UNITED

NATIONS 200-204 (1963), quoted in 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 62-63.
27. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. Senator Vandenberg, who was primarily responsible for

drafting the article (see infra at note 29 and accompanying text), argued in 1949:
"[A]rticle 51 is not the source of the right of individual and collective self-defense. It does
not establish this right; it merely recognizes its sovereign existence in all states whether
in or out of the United Nations." 95 CONG. REc. 8896 (1949) (statement of Sen.
Vandenberg).
28. Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity, March 8, 1945, pt. I,
para. 3, 60 Stat. 1831, T.I.A.S. No. 1543.
29. 95 CONG. REC. App. at 3347 (1949) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg). See also
CURRENT BIOGRAPHY: WHO'S NEWS AND WHY 1948, at 639 (1949).
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Vandenberg told the second meeting of Commission III on June 13,
1945: "[W]e have here recognized the inherent right of self-defense,
whether individual or collective, which permits any sovereign state
among us... to ward off attack pending adequate action by the parent
body. And we specifically recognize the continuous validity of mutual
protection pacts . . . ."3o In a 1949 address to the Inter-American Bar
Association, Vandenberg stressed that one of the primary reasons for insisting on the right of states to act independently to meet aggression was
the realization that the veto power could block effective action by the
Security Council. He stated: "[I]f the Security Council fails to act-or is
stopped from acting, for example, by a veto-article 51 continues to confound aggression. The United Nations is thus saved from final impotence. So is righteous peace." 8 1
In May 1947 the United Nations Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents reported to the United Nations Security Council that Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria had "supported the
guerrilla warfare in Greece." 3 2 During the Security Council's consideration of the issue, a United States representative "expressed the view that
the failure of the Security Council to act did not preclude individual or
collective action by states willing to act, so long as the action taken was
in accordance with the general purposes and principles of the United
Nations."83 Although a Soviet veto3 blocked effective Security Council
30. Statement of Senator Vandenberg at San Francisco Conference, quoted in 12
supra note 12, at 99. See also 91 CONG. REc. 6982 (1945) (statement of
Sen. Vandenberg).
31. 91 CONG. REc. App. at 3347 (1949) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg). Other
senior United States officials took an identical position. In July 1945 John Foster Dulles
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "At San Francisco, one of the things which
we stood for most stoutly, and which we achieved with the greatest difficulty, was a
recognition of the fact that that doctrine of self-defense, enlarged at Chapultepec to be a
doctrine of collective self-defense, could stand unimpaired and could function without the
approval of the Security Council." The Charter of the United Nations: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 349-50 (1945) (statement
of John Foster Dulles, official adviser to United States delegation at San Francisco),
quoted in 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 85.
32. The U.S. & U.N. Report by the President to Congress for the Year 1947 at 1723 [hereinafter U.S. & U.N.: Report], quoted in 5 WHrrEMAN, supra note 12, at 281.
See also 93 CONG. REc. 3277 (1947) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg).
WmTEmAN,

33. GoomciH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
DocuMENTs 104, 106-107 (2d ed. 1949), quoted in 12 NVHrrEMAN, supra note 12,
at 23. United States Representative Austin told the Security Council:
I do not think that we should interpret narrowly the "Great Charter" of the
United Nations. In modern times, there are many ways in which force can be used
by one State against the territorial integrity of another. Invasion by organized arAND
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action, the General Assembly did pass a resolution declaring that "the
continued aid given by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the Greek
guerrillas endangers peace in the Balkans, and is inconsistent with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." 5
That the Court has chosen a dispute among American states to limit
the important doctrine of collective defense is ironic, for it was at the
initial insistence of Latin American delegations that the drafters inserted
the collective security provision of article 51 in the Charter in 1945.36

mies is not the only means for delivering an attack against a country's independence. Force is effectively used today through devious methods of infiltration, intimidation and subterfuge.
But this does not deceive anyone. No intelligent person in possession of the facts
can fail to recognize here the use of force, however devious the subterfuge may be.
We must recognize what intelligent and informed citizens already know. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, in supporting guerrillas in northern Greece, have been
using force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece.
They have in fact been committing acts of the very kind which the United Nations
was designed to prevent, and have violated the most important of the basic principles upon which our Organization was founded.
2 U.N. SCOR (147th and 148th mtg.) at 1120-21 (1947), quoted in Nicar. v. U.S.,
Merits, 1986 I.O.J. at 335 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
34. U.S. & U.N.: Report, supra note 32, at 17-23, quoted in 5 WHrrEMAN, supra
note 12, at 282.
35. G.A. Res. 193, 3 U.N. GAOR at 18-19 (1948), reprinted in McDougal & Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to InternationalCoercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J. 1057, 1111-1112 (1959), quoted in 5 WnrrEMAN, supra note 12, at 825.
36. See North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 101, 102, 104-105 (1949) [hereinafter North Atlantic Treaty:
Hearings] (statement of Lleras Camargo, delegate of Colombia, at the meeting of Committee 111/4), quoted in 12 WHrrEMAN, supra note 12, at 99. On May 23, 1945, Colombia delegate Lleras Camargo told Committee 111/4:
The Latin American countries understood, as Senator Vandenberg has said, that
the origin of the term, "collective self-defense" is identified with the necessity of
preserving regional systems like the inter-American one. . . . And the right of
defense is not limited to the country which is the direct victim of aggression but
extends to those countries which have established solidarity, through regional arrangements, with the country directly attacked. This is the typical case of the
American system. The Act of Chapultepec provides for the collective defense of the
hemisphere and establishes that if an American nation is attacked all the rest consider themselves attacked. Consequently, such action as they may take to repel
aggression, authorized by the article which was discussed in sub-committee yesterday, is authorized for all of them.
Id. It is perhaps worth noting that Senator Vandenberg, who also helped negotiate the
1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121 U.N.T.S. 77, understood that by the terms of the Rio Treaty, in
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Reflecting on this history, Senator Vandenberg explained to his Senate
colleagues in 1949:
To make a long story short, Latin-America rebelled-and so did we. If
the omission [of the right of collective self-defense] had not been rectified
there would have been no Charter. It was rectified, finally, after infinite

travail, by agreement upon article 51 of the Charter. Nothing in the
Charter is of greater immediate importance and nothing in the Charter
37
is of equal potential importance.

There is additional irony in the Court's use of a dispute involving Cuban
and other Marxist-Leninist aggression in Latin America to limit the
scope of collective self-defense. The Inter-American system has addressed
such aggression on numerous occasions and has taken the position repeatedly that collective self-defense involving the use of armed force was
permissible if necessary to bring such aggression to an end. 8
the event of an attack against a party to the treaty it was the right of every other party to
"decide upon its own immediate action in fulfillment of the basic pledge" of the treaty prior to any agreement on a collective response. Vandenberg, Successful Conclusion of
the Inter-American Conference, 17 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 502, 504 (September 14, 1947)
(emphasis in original).
37. 95 CONG. REc. 8892 (1949) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg) (emphasis added).
38. Consider, for example, the Organization of American States (OAS) response to
Cuban aggression against Venezuela in 1963, 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 814-15,
819-20. In considering Cuban aggression against Venezuela, the ministers at the Ninth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs resolved:
2. To condemn emphatically the present Government of Cuba for its acts of
aggression and of intervention against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty,
and the political independence of Venezuela.
5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out
acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more
of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their
essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or
collective form, which could go so far as resort to armedforce, until such time as
the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of
the hemisphere.

Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added). For the full text of this resolution, see 5 WHrrEMAN,
supra note 12, at 841-42.
Professors Thomas and Thomas have written:
[Tjhe OAS has labelled assistance by a state to a revolutionary group in another
state for purposes of subversion as being aggression or intervention. If this subversive intervention culminates in an armed attack by the rebel group, it can be said
that an armed attack as visualized by Article 3 of the Rio Treaty has occurred.
A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965: WORKING PAPER
FROM THE NINTH HAMMERSKJ6LD FORUM 27-28 (1967), quoted in Moore, supra note
15, at 84.
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Moreover, collective defense responses in the Inter-American system
have not been limited merely to overt and direct armed aggression. A
1966 study by the Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies observed:
[W]hen the [OAS] Charter sets forth the principle of solidarity it refers to
"Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the
inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State" . . and not only to "armed attack," as does
the Rio Treaty, and ... it does not limit the validity of "collective selfdefense" to an aggression of that nature ....
3

Turning from the OAS Charter to the Rio Treaty, this same study
concluded:
[N]othing prevents the characterization as acts of aggression, of certain
acts, analogous to invasion or armed attack, which do not exactly possess
the characteristics of the acts described in Article 9 [of the Rio Treaty]. In
this regard, acts which have been compared to armed attack for purposes
of self-defense or other reasons should be borne in mind, such as "aid to
armed bands" as foreseen in the Act Relating to the Definition of Aggression (1932-33), including the state's tolerance of these activities, and material aid to "guerrillas" operating in the territory of a third state, which
was the position assumed by certain governments in the course of the debates in the United Nations on the Greek question (1947). In brief, like
the [OAS] Charter, the Rio Treaty intrinsically appears to authorize a
certain flexibility in interpreting the type of action that follows from the
different hypotheses of aggression.' 0
Addressing the question of "just which measures of self-defense . . .
states are authorized to take until the Organ of Consultation meets and
takes a decision," this important study concludes that, "in the interAmerican system," the institution of self-defense "has been extended to
cover 'aggression which is not an armed attack.' "41
The United States Senate discussed the issue of collective self-defense
in detail during its consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson noted that the provisions of article 51 had been removed from the portion of the Charter dealing with "Regional arrangements" so that the "inherent right of individual and collective self-de39.

INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-

AMERICAN SYsTEm-ITs DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING 108-18 (1966),

in 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 695.
40. 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 696.
41.

Id. at 698.

quoted
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fense should not be associated with any other idea whatever; it is a
complete, absolute right. ...- Senator Fulbright asked: "Would an
internal revolution, perhaps aided and abetted by an outside state, in
which armed force was being used in an attempt to drive the recognized
government from power be deemed an 'armed attack' within the meaning of article 5 [of the NATO treaty]?" Secretary Acheson responded: "I
43
think it would be an armed attack."1

In a lengthy report to the Senate on this treaty, Senator Vandenberg,
who had risen since San Francisco to the position of Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, explained:
Are we bound to support a member state against internal attack which
seeks to overthrow the government? We are not bound, directly or indirectly, to take sides in civil wars. We are pledged only against armed aggression by one state against another. If civil war should include external
armed aggression, identified by us as such, we would be obligated to take
such steps against the external armed aggression as we would deem neces44
sary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Many non-American experts have also endorsed this consistent United

42. North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings, supra note 36, at 17, quoted in 12 WHITEsupra note 12, at 94-95.
43. North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings, supra note 36, at 58, quoted in 12 WHiTEMAN, supra note 12, at 232.
44. 95 CONG. REc. 8897 (1949) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg). The report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee which accompanied the NATO Treaty dealt with
the application of article 5 to externally-assisted revolutionary movements in this way:
The committee notes that article 5 would come into operation only when a nation
had committed an international crime by launching an armed attack against a
party to the treaty. The first question which would arise would be whether or not
an armed attack had in fact occurred. If the circumstances were not clear, there
would presumably be consultation but each party would have the responsibility of
MAN,

determining for itself the answer to this question of fact .... Obviously, purely

internal disorders or revolutions would not be considered "armed attacks" within
the meaning of article 5. However, if a revolution were aided and abetted by an
outside power such assistance might possibly be considered an armed attack. Each
party would have to decide, in the light of the circumstances surrounding the case
and the nature and extent of the assistance, whether, in fact, an armed attack had
occurred and article 5 [was] thus brought into play.
NORTH ATLANTc TREATY, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-

TIONS, S. ExEc. REP. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949), quoted in 12
supra note 12, at 856.

WHrrEMAN,

1987]

PEACE AND THE WORLD COURT

States position 45 on the scope of the inherent right of states to collective
45. For example, in July 1958 the Government of Lebanon asked the United States
to send armed forces to help preserve the independence and integrity of that country,
which was facing a revolt "supported by sizable amounts of arms, ammunition, and
money.., infiltrated from Syria... ." Messagefrom President Eisenhower to the Congress of the United States, July 15, 1958, 39 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 997, at 182-83
(1958), quoted in 5 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 827. In explaining this deployment to
the United States Congress, President Eisenhower asserted:
I have concluded that . . . the measures thus far taken by the United Nations
Security Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of
Lebanon.... Pending the taking of adequate measures by the United Nations, the
United States will be acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent right - the right of all nations to work together and to seek
help when necessary to preserve their independence.
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT: DwIGr

D.

EISENHOWER

1958, at 550-52 (1959),

quoted in 5 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 475. In addressing the Third Emergency
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on August 13, 1958, President
Eisenhower said:
Our assistance to Lebanon has but one single purpose - that is the purpose of the
charter and of such historic resolutions of the United Nations as the "Essentials of
Peace" resolution of 1949 and the "Peace Through Deeds" resolution of 1950.
These denounce, as a form of aggression and as an international crime, the fomenting of civil strife in the interest of a foreign power.
Programfor the Near East, 39 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 1001, at 337-38 (1958), quoted in
5 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 836. More than a decade later, on March 25, 1969,
Lawrence Hargrove, United Nations Representative to the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression, said:
The Charter speaks in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the "use of force" in international relations; it does not differentiate among the various kinds of illegal force,
ascribing degrees of illegality according to the nature of the techniques of force
employed.... There is simply no provision in the Charter, from start to finish,
which suggests that a State can in any way escape or ameliorate the Charter's
condemnation of illegal acts of force against another State by a judicious selection
of means to its illegal ends.
Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 336 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). Four years later,
Steven Schwebel, United States Representative to the Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, observed that "the Charter of the United Nations makes no
distinction between direct and indirect uses of force" and that the "most pervasive forms
of modern aggression tend to be indirect ones." Id. United States support for "collective"
measures in response to Cuban intervention in Latin America dates back to 1959. For
example, following Cuban-sponsored guerrilla campaigns against Panama, Nicaragua
and the Dominican Republic, United States Ambassador Dreier told the Council of the
Organization of American States on July 10, 1959:
It is evident, Mr. Chairman, that basic principles of the Organization of American
States are indeed jeopardized by the present situation. One of these principles is
that of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states. The active participation of foreign elements in effort to overthrow the governments of states in this
area constitutes a definite threat to that principle. If it is permitted to be violated
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defense. 6 Sir Humphrey Waldock has written, for example, that "any
assistance to a Member engaged in legitimate self-defence appears to be
authorised by article 51."' 7
Not every act of external assistance to an insurgency movement constitutes an "armed attack" and justifies a responsive use of force. To determine whether acts constitute armed aggression, one must consider the
nature and extent of the external assistance and its relative impact on the
ability of the indigenous insurgents to accomplish their objectives. Under
these criteria, the Nicaraguan aggression against El Salvador certainly
qualifies as an armed attack.' The central issue, however, should be
whether the aggression is of such a nature to justify an armed defensive
response, not whether a victim of external armed aggression may obtain
the help of treaty partners in exercising its admitted right of self-defense.

in the present situation, it will be violated increasingly in the future. The foundation of our structure will then quickly crumble. Another principle affected here is
that of collective security as set forth in the clear terms of the Rio Treaty and the
Charter of the Organization. The OAS has developed a system without parallel
elsewhere in the world for guaranteeing the security of states against aggression.
41 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 1048, at 136-38 (1959), quoted in 12 WHITEMAN, supra note
12, at 791.
46. For example, Mr. R6ling, of the Netherlands, told the 289th meeting of the
United Nations General Assembly: "Article 51 of the charter referred only to the inherent right of self-defence in the event of 'armed attack.' But if the right of self-defence was
based on the right of self-preservation, a State must surely have the right to defend itself
against both types [direct and indirect] of aggression." Defining Aggression, supra note
24, at 17, 71-74, quoted in 5 WHrrEMAN, supra note 12, at 820. See also 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 12, at 91. Professor Quincy Wright - whose distinguished career
included service as president of the American Society of International Law, the American
Political Science Association, and the International Political Science Association - argued in 1957 that "every international obligation not to engage in hostilities carries the
qualification, by implication if not by express statement, that it does not impair a state's
capacity to use armed force . . . for necessary self-defense . . . or for assisting, if requested, another state in an armed action permissible to the latter." Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 257, 269 (1957).
47. Waldock, supra note 23, at 504, quoted in 12 WHITEMAN, supra note'12, at 98.
48. See generally R. TURNER, supra note 1, and Moore, supra note 15. Nicaraguan
aid totally transformed the nature of the conflict in El Salvador between 1980 and early
1981. In April 1980 United States Ambassador Robert White characterized El Salvador
as being in "a prerevolutionary situation." El Salvador Tilts FurtherToward Full Civil
War, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1980, at E2, col. 1. Cf Wood, Carter OrdersMilitary Supplies to Embattled Junta in Salvador, Wash. Star, Jan. 15, 1981, at 1, col. 1. In January 1981 the Washington Post reported: "[Tihe guerrillas have proven they can mount
coordinated actions virtually anywhere in this overcrowded Central American country
and operate almost freely in the rural areas." Dickey, U.S. Adds "Lethal" Aid to El
Salvador, Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 4.

19871

PEACE AND THE WORLD COURT

Unfortunately, the Court has seen fit to limit sharply the fundamental
doctrine of collective self-defense.4 9 While recognizing that "assistance to
rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support ....may be regarded as a threat or use of force,"' 50 and "may well
constitute a breach of the principle of the non-use of force and an intervention in the internal affairs of a State, that is, a form of conduct which

is certainly wrongful.

.

,5'

nevertheless, the Court concluded:

[T]he lawfulness of the use of force by a State in response to a wrongful
act of which it has not itself been the victim is not admitted when this
wrongful act is not an armed attack. In the view of the Court, under
international law in force today - whether customary international law
or that of the United Nations system - States do not have a right of
"collective" armed response to acts which do not constitute an "armed
52
attack."1
Subsequently, the Court reaffirmed this conclusion and stated:
The acts of which Nicaragua is accused .. .could only have justified
proportionate counter-measures on the part of the State which had been
the victim of these acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica.
They could not justify counter-measures taken by a third State, the United
States, and particularly could not justify intervention involving the use of

49. Keep in mind that Senator Vandenberg, who was essentially the "father" of article 51, indicated that the Charter would not have been approved in this article's absence.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 104.
51. Id. at 127.
52. Id. at 110. See also id. at 120 ("The exercise of the right of collective selfdefense presupposes that an armed attack has occurred.... .") Given the virtual "mirror
image" nature of the United States assistance to the contras vis-h-vis Sandinista aid to
the Salvadoran insurgents, it is interesting to note the Court's description of the United
States action as an "armed response" to Nicaraguan actions which the Court refuses to
acknowledge is an "armed attack" (or "armed aggression"). Compare the types of assistance that the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found "with certainty"
that Nicaragua had been giving to the rebels in El Salvador, supra note 8, with the
Court's finding that United States support for the contras "took various forms over the
years, such as logistic support, the supply of information on the location and movements
of the Sandinista troops, the use of sophisticated methods of communication, the deployment of field broadcasting networks, radar coverage, etc." Id. at 61. Nicaragua did not
even claim that United States personnel took a direct part in any hostilities, see, e.g., id.
at 45, 61, 118-19, 124-25. The Court concluded specifically that the evidence presented
failed to prove the United States "created" the contra force, and further failed to prove
the United States gave "direct . . .combat support" to the contras, as Nicaragua had
charged. Id. at 61-62.
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force.5"
The legal principle the Court embraced in this holding is not unique.
Indeed, a draft by thirteen relatively small states as an alternative to
Soviet5 4 and Western5 5 definitions of "aggression" before the General
Assembly in 1974 proposed a similar rule.56 Yet as Professor Julius
Stone observed, the draft was "at odds with the Charter and general
international law as hither to accepted ... ,,5 and both the United Nations Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression and the
58
General Assembly have rejected it.
The message in the Court's holding is as clear as it is alarming. After
a massive seven year buildup, Nicaragua has now the largest military
force in the history of Central America. 9 While the Sandinistas have
increased their army by approximately 2000 percent, 0 their peace-loving

53. Id. at 127.
54. The Soviet draft definition included under the heading "armed aggression (direct
or indirect)": "The use by a State of armed force by sending armed bands, mercenaries,
terrorists or saboteurs to the territory of another State and engagement in other forms of
subversive activity involving the use of armed force with the aim of promoting an internal
upheaval in another State.... ." A/8719, p. 8, quoted in Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986
I.C.J. at 341 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
55. Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States proposed that the General Assembly definition of aggression bar "overt or covert, direct or
indirect" use of force by a state against the territorial integrity or political independence
of another state, including: "(7) Organizing, supporting or directing subversive activities
aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government of another State." Id.
56. The thirteen state proposal provided: "When a state is a victim in its own territory of subversive and/or terrorist acts by irregular, volunteer or armed bands organized
or supported by another State, it may take all reasonable and adequate steps to safeguard
its existence and its institutions, without having recourse to the right of individual or
collective self-defense against the other State under Article 51 of the Charter." Id. at 342.
57. J. STONE, CONFIner THROUGH CONSENSUS 89-90 (1977), quoted in Nicar. v.
U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 342 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
58. Article 3 of the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression included: "(g) The
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to
the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein." Nicar. v. U.S., Merits,
1986 I.C.J. at 343 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
59. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE AND U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE
SANDINISTA MILITARY BUILDUP

(Rev. 1985). Months before the United States even

began considering giving aid to the Nicaraguan insurgency, the Sandinistas announced
plans to build the largest armed forces in the history of Central America. See, e.g., Riding, Fearful Nicaraguans Building 200,000-Strong Militia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,
1981, at A2, col. 3.
60. Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Interior Luis Carribn testified before the Court on
September 13, 1985, that "the Sandinista forces by the end of 1979 - the Sandinista
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neighbor to the south, Costa Rica, has continued to pursue its democratic
path without any army at all.61 During this time, Costa Rican leaders
have frequently denounced Nicaragua for its support of terrorist activities,6'2 which were unprecedented in modern Costa Rica prior to the
Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, and there are indications that Nicaragua intends eventually to engineer the overthrow of the Costa Rican government.63 Until June 27, 1986, when the Court issued its opinion on

armed forces - were somewhere in between 3,000 and 4,000 armed men.... [T]he
armed men were around 3,000 or a little bit more." Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Uncorrected Verbatim Record,
CR 85/20, at 45 (1985) [hereinafter Uncorrected Verbatim Record]. In 1986 the
London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies estimated there were nearly
64,000 active duty soldiers in the Sandinista army. CentralAmerica Sets Arms Growth
Record, Wash. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, at 6A, col. 5. The current Nicaraguan army is
about 8.5 times larger than the 7,500 member National Guard of the Somoza dictatorship in late 1978. See, e.g., Riding, Supplementary Material, N.Y. Times News Service,
Aug. 24, 1978, at 24.
61. Costa Rica, which has a population (approximately 2.8 million) similar in size to
that of Nicaragua (approximately 3.1 million), has no army and only a lightly-armed
"civil guard" of about 8,000 men. See, e.g., Costa Rica Asks U.S. for Small Arms, N.Y.
Times, May 6, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
62. For example, following the July 3, 1982 bombing of the San Jose office of the
Honduran National Airline (SAHSA), the Costa Rican government arrested a member
of the Colombian terrorist organization "M-19," who confessed to the crime. On July 27
the Costa Rican Government declared three officials of the Nicaraguan Embassy personae non gratae, and informed other foreign embassies in San Jose that the terrorist
had admitted he was acting under a "plan" devised and directed from Managua, Nicaragua, by Rafael Lacayo of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior. He stated that the plan
"included operations to sabotage important facilities in Costa Rica, other terrorist acts,
kidnappings, attacks on banks and acts against public institutions, agencies, and companies of other Central American countries." This statement by the Costa Rican Ministry
of Foreign Relations and Worship was transmitted to the Court on August 17, 1984,
during the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings. Counter-Memorial for the United
States, Nicaragua v. United States (Annex 57) (submitted to the International Court of
Justice, August 17, 1984) [hereinafter Counter-Memorial].
63. As a Costa Rican newspaper reported:
Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez charged that "In our country
terrorism and subversion can only exist with outside help because among the Costa
Ricans objective conditions do not exist for these two phenomena to occur." The
President commented on this matter when he confirmed that he had asked former
President Jose Figueres to speak to ...Sandinist leaders of the concern regarding
the participation of Nicaraguan diplomats in acts of terrorism and subversion....
The President asked Figueres to tell ...

the Sandinist leaders that the participa-

tion of Nicaraguan Embassy and consulate officials in terrorist actions had been
proven. He also sent ...the message that he had information... that there was a

plan to destabilize our country and thereby destroy our democratic system.
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the merits of the ParamilitaryActivities case, Costa Rica had every reason to believe that its treaty partners could come to its aid in the event of
an intensification of Nicaraguan aggression (which aggression, it is
worth noting, Nicaragua did not even bother to deny before the Court)."
Sadly, because of the World Court's handling of this case, that may no
longer be true. The long-term impact of this decision on both Nicaragua
and Costa Rica is unknown, but one can hardly view it as a positive
development in promoting regional peace and stability. In 1983, a public
opinion poll conducted by the Gallup organization reported that sixtynine percent of the people surveyed in Costa Rica identified Nicaragua
as a military threat to their own country.65 When the Gallup organization updated the poll two years later, the figure had increased to ninetytwo per cent. 66

III.

THE FACTS: SELECTIVE TREATMENT OF EVIDENCE

The Court's decision to narrow the scope of a state's right to collective
self-defense in the face of armed external aggression is deeply troubling,
but it may not be the most alarming aspect of the opinion. The manner
in which the Court handled evidence offered by the two sides is of equal
concern for anyone who would have wished to see the Court play a constructive role in the resolution of armed international conflicts in the future. A few brief examples suffice to explain my shock and disappoint7
ment at the Court's handling of the evidence.1
La Nacion (San Jose, Costa Rica), Aug. 1, 1982, p. 4A. A former Sandinista intelligence
officer, Miguel Bolafios Hunter, has charged:
Since 1979 there has been a plan to neutralize democracy in Costa Rica. They are
doing it covertly in Costa Rica. They are training guerrilla groups and infiltrating
unions to cause agitation. The idea is to cause clashes with the police and Costa

Rican soldiers to cause a break between the unions and the president. When the
economy gets worse they will be able to have an organized popular force aided by
the guerrilla forces already there.
The Heritage Foundation, "Inside Communist Nicaragua: The Miguel Bolafios Transcripts," BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 30, 1983, at 12 (interview with Miguel Bolafios by
Washington Post of June 16-17, 1983). See also R. TURNER, supra note 1.
64. "In the proceedings on the merits, Nicaraguara ... has not specifically referred
to the allegations of attacks on Honduras or Costa Rica." Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986
I.C.J at 72.
65. U.S. Information Agency, Public Opinion in Four Countries of Central
America, Research Report R-1-84, at 11 (1984).
66. Meyer, A Temptationfor Democrats, Wash. Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at D-1, col. 1.
67. It is important to keep in mind that article 53 of the Court's Statute provides
that, in the event a party to a suit does not appear to defend its case, the Court "must...
satisfy itself.., that the claim [of the appearing party] is well founded in fact and law."
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Perhaps the most fundamental factual issue confronting the Court was
the question of alleged Nicaraguan assistance to the anti-government
guerrillas in El Salvador. On this point, the parties were in total disagreement and the position of the United States depended on a finding
that Nicaragua had been engaged in a major effort to overthrow the
Government of El Salvador by providing extensive assistance to Salvadoran guerrilla groups. Although Nicaragua's Foreign Minister had provided a sworn affidavit to the Court asserting that his government "is not
engaged, and has not been engaged, in the provision of arms or other
supplies to either of the factions engaged in the civil war in El Salva' the evidence suggested overwhelmingly that Nicaragua had bedor,"68
gun providing substantial assistance to Salvadoran guerrillas more than a
year before the United States began assisting the Nicaraguan contras.
In addition to the volumes of material the United States provided during the preliminary phase of the case,69 the Court was aware that Nicaragua's American lawyers had told a Pulitzer Prize-winning New York
Times reporter prior to the beginning of oral argument that they intended to admit to the Court that the Nicaraguan government had provided weapons in 1980-81." During oral argument, Nicaragua's Agent
and Counsel, Ambassador Carlos Argiiello G6mez, implicitly acknowledged such aid.7 1 Attachment three of annex 1 to Nicaragua's Memorial

Unlike in a United States civil court - where, if a party refuses to appear, the opposing
party's facts may be accepted on their face without further investigation by the court in a case before the World Court "where one party is not appearing 'it is especially
incumbent upon the Court to satisfy itself that it is in possession of all the available
facts.'" Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 25 (quoting Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at
263, 468).
68. Affidavit of Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, filed
before International Court of Justice, Apr. 21, 1984.
69. See, e.g., infra notes 83-86.
70. The New York Times reported:
Addressing a longstanding United States accusation, the lawyers for Nicaragua
[Messrs. Chayes and Reichler] said they would acknowledge [to the Court] that
the Managua Government supplied weapons to Salvadoran guerrillas for the big
January 1981 offensive against the United States-backed Government of El Salvador. But they will argue that there is no credible evidence of sustained arms shipments since then.
Christian, Nicaragua'sAmerican Lawyers PrepareCase, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at
23, col. 1. See also Christian, U.S. Says NicaraguansAid Salvadoran Rebels, id., Sept.
19, 1985, col. 5. During oral argument before the Court, Professor Chayes summarized
the facts in this way: "Nicaragua produced concrete and credible evidence all of which
shows that it was not supplying arms to El Salvador either now or in the relevant past..
." Uncorrected Verbatim Record, CR 85/26 at 30, Sept. 19, 1985 (emphasis added).
71. In discussing the allegation that Nicaragua provided arms to Salvadoran rebels in
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on the merits of the case included a statement made to United States
human rights investigators by Luis Carri6n, Nicaragua's Vice Minister
of the Interior and its most senior witness before the Court, in which he
admitted his government had given aid in the past to the Salvadoran
insurgents.7 2 In addition, press accounts quoted Salvadoran guerrilla
leaders as admitting they had received arms from Cuba through the Nicaraguan Government. 3 Most dramatically, when asked during skillful
questioning from the bench whether it was his position that "it could be
taken as a fact that at least in late 1980/early 1981 the Nicaraguan
Government was involved in the supply of arms to the Salvadoran insurgency," Nicaragua's star expert witness, former Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) employee David MacMichel, told the court: "I hate to
have it appear that you are drawing this from me like a nail out of a
block of wood but, yes, that is my opinion." 4
Indeed, the evidence of a substantial arms flow from Nicaragua to El
Salvador in the early period was so overwhelming that the Court acknowledged it.76 However, although under international law "there is a
[rebuttable] presumption that a state has knowledge of what is being
openly done in its territory, '76 the Court simply accepted the Nicaraguan Government's assertion and concluded that Nicaragua must have
been simply "powerless" to subdue the arms traffic taking place on its
territory but against its wishes, 77 despite the wealth of evidence provided
by Nicaragua's own lawyers and witnesses78 and Sandinista statements
1980 and 1981, Mr. Argiiello argued: "The position of Nicaragua ... is that it is of no
relevance to discuss happenings five years ago when the evidence itself proves that in the
past absolutely no question has been formulated as to the continuation of that situation;.
* ." Uncorrected Verbatim Record, CR 85/25 at 15 (Sept. 19, 1985).
72. "We are giving no support to the rebels in El Salvador. I don't know when we
last did. We haven't sent any material aid to them in a good long time." D. Fox AND M.
GLENNON, REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP AND THE

WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA CONCERNING ABUSES AGAINST CIVILIANS
By COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES OPERATING IN NICARAGUA 34 (1985).

73. See, e.g., Riding, Salvador Rebels: Five-Sided Alliance Searching for New,
Moderate Image, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
74. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 75.
75. Id. at 82-83.
76. Corfu Channel Case, Merits, 1949 I.C.J. at 18, quoted in 12 WHITEMAN, supra
note 12, at 19.
77. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 85-86. The Court reasoned that "if...
the exceptionally extensive resources deployed by the United States have been powerless
to prevent this traffic from keeping the Salvadoran armed opposition supplied, this suggests even more clearly how powerless Nicaragua must be with the much smaller resources at its disposal for subduing this traffic. . . ." Id.
78. See supra notes 70-72, 74 and accompanying text.
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as early as 1969 openly advocating "support for national liberation
79
movements in neighboring states."

The way in which the Court dealt with "evidence" made this incredible conclusion a little easier to understand. The Court found as reliable
evidence newspaper clippings quoting United States officials (in some
cases unnamed) or providing other information damaging to the United
States position. 80 However, when Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega
assured Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, who later recounted the
story in the New York Times Magazine, that under certain circumstances
his government was "willing to stop the movement of military aid...
through Nicaragua to El Salvador," 81 the Court, relying on Nicaragua's
representation that it was not giving such aid, concluded that this and
similar admissions to the press were not credible.8 2
The Court's treatment of numerous captured Salvadoran guerrilla
documents, reproduced in a lengthy United States Department of State
white paper, 83 and detailing shipments by the Government of Nicaragua
of hundreds of tons of arms and equipment to Salvadoran insurgents,
was equally outrageous. Even though Nicaragua made no effort to challenge or discredit these documents, the Court disregarded them completely because they were "written using cryptic language and abbrevia-

79. See, e.g., points 13 and 14 of the 1969 Program of the Sandinist Front of National Liberation, Tricontinental No. 17, 61 (Mar./Apr. 1970). Point 13 provides in
part: "The people's Sandinist revolution will practice a true combative solidarity with the
peoples fighting for their liberation." Point 14 reads in part: "The People's Sandinist
revolution .... will support an authentic unity with its brother peoples in Central

America. This unity will begin with the cooperation of forces to achieve national liberation and establish a new social system, without imperialist domination or national betrayal." Id. at 68. See also Lewthwaite, 3 Leftist Chiefs Pledge Unity in Caribbean
Area, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 14, 1980, at 6 (quoting Daniel Ortega as committing himself
to "aiding other revolutionaries"); D. NOLAN, THE IDEOLOGY AND THE SANDINISTAS
AND THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION (1984).

80. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 46, 50-51.
81. Llosa, In Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 37. See
also the statement by Mr. Ortega to Clifford Krauss, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1986, at 24.
The Nicaraguan Government made no effort to deny or challenge these published
quotations.
82. "[A]gainst the background of the firm denial by the Nicaraguan Government of
complicity in an arms flow to El Salvador, the Court cannot regard remarks of this kind
as an admission that the Government was in fact doing what it had already officially
denied and continued subsequently to deny publicly." Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J.
at 79, 80.
83. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR: DoCuMENTS DEMONSTRATING COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF THE SALVADORAN

Feb. 23, 1981 [hereinafter COMMUNIST

INTERFERENCE].
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tions."' 4 The Court explained: "For example, there are frequent
references to 'Lagos' which, according to the United States, is a codename for Nicaragua; but without such assistance [from United States
experts], the Court cannot judge whether this interpretation is correct."8 5
"Lagos" is Spanish for "lakes," and the two largest lakes in Central
America (Lago de Manaqua and Lago de Nicaragua)both lie within a
few kilometers of Managua.
Another code used in some of the documents is the letter "M," which
the State Department in an accompanying glossary alleged meant "Managua." For example, an undated "trip report" attached as "Document
G" to the white paper began by reporting: "We... arrived at M. on 13
July .... Bayardo's assistant told us... they were very busy with the
celebration and it was very difficult to hold (a meeting) since the best
time was after the 19th." The Court should have had little difficulty
taking judicial notice that Bayardo Arce is a senior Sandinista comandante, and that July 19 is the anniversary of the Sandinista seizure
of power in Nicaragua. If this was too difficult, the Court could have
simply turned back to page three of the same document to read: "Since
we were going to receive aid which all would pass through Nicaragua,
they had thought of a 'triangular deal;' that is, they would give us arms
from the EPS (Sandinista Peoples Army) and then replace them with
those which are coming, . . . [from] the socialist world . . "" Many
sources have confirmed the veracity of these documents, 1 and, as already
noted, even Nicaragua has not challenged their authenticity. For the
Court to dismiss them because some abbreviations are used is outrageous. Even if some of the documents were ambiguous because they included codes or abbreviations, a great deal of material was explicit and
could have assisted the Court in understanding the facts.
The Court accepted the Nicaraguan position over that of the United
States even regarding factual questions about which neither the Court
nor the Government of Nicaragua could claim to possess reliable independent information. For example, the United States asserted that it was

84. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.CJ. at 78.
85. Id.

86.

COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE,

supra note 83, at 8.

87. Former United States Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White, who has been
an outspoken critic of United States policy in Central America and was relieved of his
post during the early weeks of the Reagan Administration, acknowledged that the evidence contained in the State Department white paper was "genuine" and that the Salvadoran guerrillas had "imported massive quantities of arms" by way of Nicaragua. See,
e.g., Hornblower, Ousted Envoy Hits Arms Aid to Salvador, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1981,
at Al, col. 6.
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providing assistance to the contras as part of a response to a request
from the Government of El Salvador for assistance in repelling an armed
attack from Nicaragua. The only state in a credible position to contradict
this assertion was El Salvador, which filed instead a sworn Declaration
of Intervention with the Court asserting that it had been the victim of an
"armed attack" from Nicaragua "since at least 1980," 8 that the attack
was continuing,8 and that it had asked the United States for assistance
in collective self-defense.90 Despite the existence of numerous public
statements by Salvadoran officials dating back to 1980 denouncing Nicaraguan aggression and asking the United States for aid in resisting that
aggression, 91 the Court noted that in a 1984 speech before the United
States Security Council and a subsequent letter to the Court, El Salvador
had not used the words "armed attack" or "collective self-defense" and
reasoned thus:
[Ilt appears to the Court that while El Salvador did in fact officially declare itself the victim of an armed attack, and did ask for the United States
to exercise its right of collective self-defence, this occurred only on a date

88. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 73.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 120. "El Salvador, confirming this assertion by the United States, told the
Court in the Declaration of Intervention which it submitted on 15 August 1984 that it
considered itself the victim of an armed attack by Nicaragua, and that it had asked the
United States to exercise for its benefit the right of collective self-defence." Id. at 35.
91. Consider this account from the Washington Post: "[President] Duarte has denounced alleged Cuban and Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador several times during
the last few days .... He has also called on U.S. President-elect Ronald Reagan to
'export democracy' to El Salvador and the world and to increase aid to the government
here.... ." Dickey, FightingSubsides in El Salvador,Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1981, at Al,
col. 6. On March 28, 1983, Salvadoran Foreign Minister Fidel Chivez-Mefia warned
the United Nations Security Council that El Salvador was the victim of "belligerent and
hostile acts," and charged that Nicaragua "does not practice, and respects even less, the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Central American states." He
added:
Everyone is aware that the armed groups operating in El Salvador have their
central headquarters in Nicaragua. It is there that decisions are made and logistic
support is channeled - logistic support without which it would be impossible for
them to continue in their struggle and without which they would have joined in
the democratic process.
S/PV. 2425, at 7, Mar. 28, 1983. In an interview in December 1983 Salvadoran President Afvara Magafia Borja said that Nicaragua had "not ceased for one moment to invade our country." He added: "There is only one point of departure for the armed sub-

version, Nicaragua." Interview with Salvadoran President Alvara Magafia, ABC
(Madrid), Dec. 22, 1983, quoted in Counter-Memorial, supra note 62 (Annex 51). For
numerous other statements of a similar character, see R. TURNER, supra note 1.
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much later than the commencement of the United States activities which
were allegedly justified by this request."2

This shocking decision to ignore the consistent and sworn statement of
the only two sovereign states to have direct knowledge of the facts at
issue does not even pass the "straight face" test. This decision was made
despite El Salvador's explanation that it had intentionally exercised restraint in its public remarks in a desire to seek "a solution of understanding and mutual respect""3 rather than engage in rhetoric that might
lead to further escalation" and in the absence of any inconsistent statements from either government. It is difficult to defend the Court's handling of the facts of this case against charges of apparent political bias
against the United States. The short-term injury to the United States,
however, is less tragic than the long-term effect the decision may have on
the Court's perceived moral authority and the willingness of other states
to submit future controversies to the Court for resolution.
IV. CONCLUSION

This entire case has been most unfortunate. While one can understand, and indeed share, the Court's displeasure at the United States

Government's decision not to participate in the merits phase,"5 the
92. Nicar. v. U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 120.
93. Id. at 121.
94. To the extent the Court is signaling future victims of aggression that they must
energetically and openly denounce their attackers rather than seek a less confrontational
resolution, this may also be unhelpful from the perspective of promoting the peaceful
resolution of international disputes.
95. Indeed, one could argue that the case might have turned out differently had the
United States made a full presentation of its position. However, as Judge Schwebel
points out in his dissenting opinion, the evidence of political bias predates the United
States decision to withdraw from the case. Judge Schwebel notes that even the title of the
case "embraces the essential thesis of Nicaragua" and is thus "unprecedented." Nicar. v.
U.S., Merits, 1986 I.C.J. at 320-21 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). He continues:
Thus if one looks at the list of titles of all the cases which have previously been
dealt with by this Court,... one cannot find a listing which is comparable. Take,
for example, the first case, entitled: Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania).
If that case had been entitled as the current case is, it would have read something
like: Mining activitiesin the Corfu Channel against the United Kingdom. But the
Court chose a neutral formula, which recognized implicitly that Albania might
have had a defence to the claim of the United Kingdom. It did so in the case
which, perhaps more than any other of this Court, has elements in common with
the substance of the current case, concerning As it did uses of force and questions
of intervention. In the list of the 70-odd cases of this Court, none is entitled so as
to embrace only the contentions of the claimant and inferentially exclude those of
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Court's end product is not an admirable one. It departs injudiciously
from fundamental principles of law, displays a shocking selectivity in
handling factual matters, and lends support to allegations of political
bias. Those of us who still believe that international judicial tribunals
have an important role to play in international conflict resolution can
only view the case with sadness, because it may significantly undermine
the credibility of these types of tribunals.

the defendant - apart from the instant case.
Id. at 321. See also Sztucki, Intervention Under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute in the
Phase of Preliminary Proceedings: the "Salvadoran Incident," 79 AM. J. INT'L L.
1005, 1036 (1985).

